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ABSTRACT
Although normative systems, or social laws, have proved to be a
highly inﬂuential approach to coordination in multi-agent systems,
the issue of compliance to such normative systems remains prob-
lematic. In all real systems, it is possible that some members of
an agent population will not comply with the rules of a norma-
tive system, even if it is in their interests to do so. It is therefore
important to consider the extent to which a normative system is
robust, i.e., the extent to which it remains effective even if some
agents do not comply with it. We formalise and investigate three
different notions of robustness and related decision problems. We
begin by considering sets of agents whose compliance is necessary
and/or sufﬁcient to guarantee the effectiveness of a normative sys-
tem; we then consider quantitative approaches to robustness, where
we try to identify the proportion of an agent population that must
comply in order to ensure success, and ﬁnally, we consider a more
general approach, wherewe characterisethe compliance conditions
required for success as a logical formula.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems;
I.2.4 [Knowledge representation formalisms and methods]
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Normative systems, or social laws, have been widely promoted as
an approach to coordinating multi-agent systems [11, 12, 6, 8, 1,
2]. The basic idea is that a normative system is a set of constraints
on the behaviour of agents in the system; after imposing these con-
straints, itisintended thatsomedesirableoverallproperty willhold.
One of the most important issues associated with such normative
systems – and one of the most ignored – is that of compliance.
Put simply, what happens if some system participants do not com-
ply with the regulations of the normative system? Non-compliance
may be accidental (e.g., a message fails and so some participants
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arenot informed about the regulations). Alternatively, it may bede-
liberate but rational (e.g., a participant chooses to ignore the norms
because it does not see them as being in its own best interests),
or deliberately irrational (e.g., a computer virus). Whatever the
cause, it seems inevitable that, in real, large-scale systems, non-
compliance will occur, and it is therefore important to consider the
consequences of non-compliance. Existing research has addressed
the issue of non-compliance in at least two ways.
First, one can design the normative system taking the goals and
aspirations of system participants into account, so that compliance
is the rational choice for participants [2]. Using the terminology of
mechanism design [10, p.179], we try to make compliance incen-
tive compatible. Where this approach is available, it seems highly
attractive. However, given some desired objective for a normative
system, it is not always possible to construct an incentive compati-
ble normative system that achieves some outcome, and even where
it is possible, it is still likely that large, open systems will fall prey
to irrational behaviour.
Second, onecancombinethenormativesystemwithsome penalty
mechanism, to punish non-compliance [4]. The advantage of this
approach is that it can be applied to most scenarios, and that it is
familiar (this is, after all, how normative systems often work in the
real world). There are many disadvantages, however. For example,
it may be hard to detect when non-compliance has occurred, and
in large, Internet-like systems, it may be hard to impose penalties
(e.g., across national borders).
For these reasons, in this paper we introduce the notion of ro-
bustness for normative systems. Intuitively, a normative system is
robust to the extent to which it remains effective in the event of
non-compliance by some agents. Following an introduction to the
technical framework of normative systems, weintroduce and inves-
tigate three ways of characterising robustness. First, we consider
trying to identify coalitions whose compliance is necessary and/or
sufﬁcient to ensure that the normative system is effective. We char-
acterisethecomplexity ofchecking thesenotionsof robustness, and
consider cases whereverifying thesenotions of robustness iseasier.
In addition toveriﬁcation we consider the complexity of robust fea-
sibility of a normative system: given a reliable coalition, does there
exist a normative system which is effective whenever that coalition
complies? We then consider a more quantitative notion of robust-
ness, called k-robustness, where we try to identify the number of
agents that could deviate and still leave the normative system ef-
fective. Finally, we consider a more general, logical approach of
characterising robustness, whereby we deﬁne a predicate over sets
of agents, such that this predicate characterises exactly those sets
of agents whose compliance will ensure the success of the norma-
tive system. We conclude with a brief discussion, including some
pointers to related and future work.2. FORMAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the formal framework for normative
systems that we use throughout the remainder of the paper. This
framework is based on that of [8, 1, 2], which is in turn descended
from [11]. Although our presentation is complete, it is succinct,
and readers are referred to [8, 1, 2] for details and discussion.
Kripke Structures: We use Kripke structures as our basic seman-
tic model for multi-agent systems [5]. A Kripke structure is essen-
tiallya directed graph, withthe vertex set S corresponding topossi-
ble statesof thesystembeing modelled, and therelation R ⊆ S×S
capturing the possible transitions of the system; S
0 ⊆ S denotes
the initial states of the system. Intuitively, transitions are caused
by agents in the system performing actions, although we do not in-
clude such actions inoursemantic model (see, e.g., [11, 8] formod-
els which include actions as ﬁrst class citizens). An arc (s,s
′) ∈ R
corresponds to the execution of an atomic action by one of the
agents in the system. Note that we are therefore here not modelling
synchronous action. This assumption is not essential, but it sim-
pliﬁes the presentation. However, we ﬁnd it convenient to include
within our model the agents that cause transitions. We therefore
assume a set A of agents, and we label each transition in R with
the agent that causes the transition via a function α : R → A. Fi-
nally, we use a vocabulary Φ = {p,q,...} of Boolean variables
to express the properties of individual states S: we use a function
V : S → 2
Φ to label each state with the Boolean variables true (or
satisﬁed) in that state.
Formally, an agent-labelled Kripke structure (over Φ) is a 6-
tuple:
K =  S,S
0,R,A,α,V ,
where: S is a ﬁnite, non-empty set of states; S
0 ⊆ S (S
0  = ∅) is
the set of initial states; R ⊆ S × S is a total binary relation on S,
which we refer to as the transition relation; A = {1,...,n} is a
set of agents; α : R → A labels each transition in R with an agent;
and V : S → 2
Φ labels each state with the set of propositional
variables true in that state.
We hereafter refer to an agent-labelled Kripke structure simply
as a Kripke structure. A path over a transition relation R is an
inﬁnite sequence of states π = s0,s1,... such that ∀u ∈ N:
(su,su+1) ∈ R. If u ∈ N, then we denote by π[u] the compo-
nent indexed by u in π (thus π[0] denotes the ﬁrst element, π[1]
the second, and so on). A path π such that π[0] = s is an s-path.
Let ΠR(s) denote the set of s-paths over R; since it will usually
be clear from context, we often omit reference to R, and simply
write Π(s). We will sometimes refer to and think of an s-path as a
possible computation, or system evolution, from s.
CTL: We use Computation Tree Logic (CTL), a well-known and
widely used branching time temporal logic, to express the objec-
tives of normative systems [5]. Given a set Φ = {p,q,...} of
atomic propositions, the syntax of CTL is deﬁned by the following
grammar, where p ∈ Φ:
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | E f ϕ | E(ϕU ϕ) | A f ϕ | A(ϕU ϕ)
The semantics of CTL are given with respect to the satisfaction
relation “|=”, which holds between pointed structures K,s, (where
K is a Kripke structure and s is a state in K), and formulae of the
language. The satisfaction relation is deﬁned as follows:
K,s |= ⊤;
K,s |= p iff p ∈ V(s) (where p ∈ Φ);
K,s |= ¬ϕ iff not K,s |= ϕ;
K,s |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff K,s |= ϕ or K,s |= ψ;
K,s |= A eϕ iff ∀π ∈ Π(s) : K,π[1] |= ϕ;
K,s |= E eϕ iff ∃π ∈ Π(s) : K,π[1] |= ϕ;
K,s |= A(ϕU ψ) iff ∀π ∈ Π(s), ∃u ∈ N, s.t. K,π[u] |= ψ and
∀v,(0 ≤ v < u) : K,π[v] |= ϕ
K,s |= E(ϕU ψ) iff ∃π ∈ Π(s),∃u ∈ N, s.t. K,π[u] |= ψ and
∀v,(0 ≤ v < u) : K,π[v] |= ϕ
The remaining classical logic connectives (“∧”, “→”, “↔”) are
deﬁned as abbreviations in terms of ¬,∨ in the conventional way.
The remaining CTL temporal operators are deﬁned:
A♦ϕ ≡ A(⊤U ϕ) E♦ϕ ≡ E(⊤U ϕ)
A ϕ ≡ ¬E♦¬ϕ E ϕ ≡ ¬A♦¬ϕ
We say ϕ is satisﬁable if K,s |= ϕ for some Kripke structure K
and state s in K; ϕ is valid if K,s |= ϕ for all Kripke structures
K and states s in K. The problem of checking whether K,s |= ϕ
for given K,s,ϕ (model checking) can be done in deterministic
polynomial time, while checking whether a given ϕ is satisﬁable or
whether ϕ is valid is EXPTIME-complete [5]. We write K |= ϕ if
K,s0 |= ϕ for all s0 ∈ S
0, and |= ϕ if K |= ϕ for all K.
Later, we will make use of two fragments of CTL: the universal
language L
u (with typical element µ), and the existential fragment
L
e (typical element ε):
µ ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | p | ¬p | µ ∨ µ | µ ∧ µ | A f µ | A µ | A(µU µ)
ε ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | p | ¬p | ε ∨ ε | ε ∧ ε | E f ε | E ε | E(εU ε)
The key point about these fragments is as follows. Let us say,
for two Kripke structures K1 =  S,S
0,R1,A,α,V  and K2 =
 S,S
0,R2,A,α,V  that K1 is a subsystem of K2 and K2 is a su-
persystem of K1, (denoted K1 ⊑ K2), iff R1 ⊆ R2. Then we have
(cf. [8]).
THEOREM 1 ([8]). Suppose K1 ⊑ K2, and s ∈ S. Then:
∀ε ∈ L
e : K1,s |= ε ⇒ K2,s |= ε; and
∀µ ∈ L
u : K2,s |= µ ⇒ K1,s |= µ.
Normative Systems: For our purposes, a normative system (or
“norm”) is simply a set of constraints on the behaviour of agents
in a system [1]. More precisely, a normative system deﬁnes, for
every possible system transition, whether or not that transition is
considered to be legal or not. Different normative systems may
differ on whether or not a transition is legal. Formally, a norma-
tive system η (w.r.t. a Kripke structure K =  S,S
0,R,A,α,V )
is simply a subset of R, such that R \ η is a total relation. The
requirement that R \ η is total is a reasonableness constraint: it
prevents normative systems which lead to states with no successor.
Let N(R) = {η : (η ⊆ R) & (R \ η is total)} be the set of nor-
mative systems over R. The intended interpretation of a normative
system η is that (s,s
′) ∈ η means transition (s,s
′) is forbidden in
the context of η. We denote the empty normative system by η∅, i.e.,
η∅ = ∅. Let A(η) = {α(s,s
′) | (s,s
′) ∈ η} denote the set of
agents involved in η.
Theeffect ofimplementinganormative systemonaKripkestruc-
ture is to eliminate from it all transitions that are forbidden accord-
ing to this normative system (see [8, 1]). If K is a Kripke structure,
and η is a normative system over K, then K †η denotes the Kripke
structure obtained from K by deleting transitions forbidden in η.
Formally, if K =  S,S
0,R,A,α,V , and η ∈ N(R), then let
K †η = K
′ be the Kripke structure K
′ =  S
′,S
0′,R
′,A
′,α
′,V
′ 
where:• S = S
′, S
0 = S
0′, A = A
′, and V = V
′;
• R
′ = R \ η; and
• α
′ is the restriction of α to R
′:
α
′(s,s
′) =

α(s,s
′) if (s,s
′) ∈ R
′
undeﬁned otherwise.
The next most basic question we can ask inthe context of norma-
tive systems is as follows. We are given a Kripke structure K, rep-
resenting the state transition graph of our system, and we are given
a CTL formula ϕ, representing the objective of a normative system
designer (that is, the objective characterises what a designer wishes
to accomplish with a normative system). The feasibility problem
is then whether or not there exists a normative system η such that
implementing η in K will achieve ϕ, i.e., whether K † η |= ϕ. We
say that η is effective for ϕ in K if K † η |= ϕ.
We make use of operators on normative systems which corre-
spond to groups of agents “defecting” from the normative system.
Formally, let K =  S,S
0,R,A,α,V  be a Kripke structure, let
C ⊆ A be a set of agents over K, and let η be a normative sys-
tem over K. Then η ↾ C denotes the normative system that is
the same as η except that it only contains the arcs of η that cor-
respond to the actions of agents in C, i.e., η ↾ C = {(s,s
′) :
(s,s
′) ∈ η & α(s,s
′) ∈ C}. Also, η ↿ C denotes the nor-
mative system that is the same as η except that it only contains
the arcs of η that do not correspond to actions of agents in C:
η ↿ C = {(s,s
′) : (s,s
′) ∈ η & α(s,s
′)  ∈ C}.
3. NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY
As we noted in the introduction, the basic intuition behind robust
normative systems is that they remain effective in the presence of
deviation, or non-compliance, by some members of the agent pop-
ulation. As we shall see, there are several different ways of for-
mulating robustness. Our ﬁrst approach is to try to characterise
“lynchpin” agents – those agents whose compliance with the nor-
mative system is somehow crucial for the successful operation of
the system. This seems appropriate when there are “key players” in
the normative system – for example, where there is a single point
of failure. In this section, we therefore consider coalitions whose
compliance is necessary and/or sufﬁcient to ensure that the norma-
tive system is effective.
We say that C ⊆ A are sufﬁcient for η in the context of K and
ϕ if the compliance of C with η is effective, i.e., iff:
∀C
′ ⊆ A : (C ⊆ C
′) ⇒ [K † (η ↾ C
′) |= ϕ].
The following example illustrates this notion of sufﬁciency.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider four agents who are attending a con-
ference with an on-site computer facility. This service centre has
currently one printer, two scanners and three PCs available. Agent
a has tasks that require access to a printer and PC, agent b needs
a printer and scanner, agent c is in need of a scanner and PC
and agent d will need a scanner only. The set of agents is A =
{a,b,c,d}. Theyareinterested inusingresources of typeR1,R2,R3,
of each resource type Rj there are j instances of each: R1 =
{printer1}, R2 = {scanner1,scanner2}, R3 = {pc1,pc2,pc3}.
At a given point in time, a resource can be owned by an agent. The
actions availabletotheagents aremaking availablearesource they
currently own, or taking possession of a resource which is avail-
able. We assume that the agents never act at exactly the same time;
in particular we assume that actions are turn-based – ﬁrst a can
perform some action, then b, and so on. A state s is a tuple
s =  Oa,Ob,Oc,Od,i 
where, for each i ∈ A, Oi is the set of resources currently owned
by i.
The number of agents that own a resource of type j cannot be
greater than j. Let, for each resource Rj and state s, avail(j,s) be
the number of resources of type j that are not owned by an agent.
The component i ∈ A of s denotes whose turn it is: we write
turn(s) = i. If Rj ∩Oi  = ∅, we say that i owns a resource of type
j and write Rj ≺ Oi.
Our agents are not equal. In order to fullﬁl his task, agent a
would every now and then like to use resources of type R1 and
R3 simultaneously. We write Useful(a) = {R1,R3}. Simililary,
Useful(b) = {R1,R2}, Useful(c) = {R2,R3} while Useful(d)
= {R2}.
Let s =  Oa,Ob,Oc,Od,i  and s
′ =  O
′
a,O
′
b,O
′
c,O
′
d,i
′  be
two states. Then (s,s
′) ∈ R iff
1. a
′ = b,b
′ = c,c
′ = d and d
′ = a;
2. for all k  = i and all j: Rj ≺ Ok ⇔ Rj ≺ O
′
k;
3. if Rj ≺ O
′
i and Rj  ≺ Oi then avail(j,s) > 0.
Furthermore, α(s,s
′) = i when turn(s) = i.
Let the starting state of the system be such that it is agent a’s
turn, and nobody owns any resource. If we call this system K0,
then a ﬁrst norm η0 we impose on K is that no agent (i) owns two
resources of the same type at the same time, (ii) takes posession of
a resource that he does not need, (iii) takes possession of two new
resources simultaneously, and (iv) fails to take possession of some
useful resource if it is available when it is his turn:
η0 =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
(s,s
′) |
turn(s) = i, and
(∃j : |O
′
i ∩ Rj| ≥ 2, or
∃j : |O
′
i ∩ Rj| ≥ 1 and Rj  ∈ Useful(i), or
∃x,y : x  = y,x,y ∈ O
′
i and x,y  ∈ Oi, or
∀j : (Rj ∈ Useful(i),|Oi ∩ Rj| = 0,
avail(j,s) > 0) ⇒ |O
′
i ∩ Rj| = 0).
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
Let K1 = K0 † η0. Now, in order to formulate some objectives of
the system, let a
o
j denote that agent a owns a resource of type j and
similarly for the other agents. Let
happy(i) =
^
Rj∈Useful(i)
i
o
j
Thus happy(i) means that i is in possession of all his useful
resources, simultaneously. Our ﬁrst objective is:
ϕ1 = A
^
i∈A
A♦happy(i).
The normative system that we will use for it is
η1 = {(s,s
′) | turn(s) = i & Oi = Useful(i)& O
′
i  = ∅}
In words: if at some point an agent simultaneously owns all the
resources that are useful for him, then he will make them available
if it is his turn. Which coalitions are sufﬁcient for this norm in the
context of K1 and ϕ1? First of all, consider a coalition without
agent a. If a does not comply with norm η1, then he can grab
the printer and hold on to it forever. Thus, agent b will not be
happy, because there is only one printer. The same argument holds
for a coalition without agent b. Thus, it seems that any sufﬁcient
coalition must include both agents a and b. But {a,b} alone is
not a sufﬁcient coalition, as the following scenario illustrates: (1)
a grabs a PC; (2) b grabs the printer; (3) c grabs a scanner; (4)
d grabs the other scanner. Now, if c and d do not comply with η1,
it might be that they never give up their scanners, in which caseb never will be happy. However, if a and b are joined by c in
complying with η1, the objective is obtained:
K1 † (η1 ↾ {a,b,c}) |= ϕ1
– it is easy to see that in fact {a,b,c} is sufﬁcient for η1 in the
context of K1 and ϕ1. But {a,b,c} and its extension {a,b,c,d}
are not the only sufﬁcient coalitions in this context: {a,b,d} is
also sufﬁcient.
Now, associated with this notion is a decision problem: we are
given K, η, ϕ, and C, and asked whether C are sufﬁcient for
η in the context of K and ϕ. It may appear at ﬁrst sight that
this is an easy decision problem: don’t we just need to check that
K † (η ↾ C) |= ϕ? The answer is no. For suppose the objective is
an existential property η ∈ L
e. Then the fact that K †(η ↾ C) |= η
and C ⊆ C
′ does not guarantee that K † (η ↾ C
′) |= η. In-
tuitively, this is because, if more agents than C comply, then this
might eliminate transitions from K, causing the existential prop-
erty η to be falsiﬁed.
EXAMPLE 2. We continue Example 1. To demonstrate that suf-
ﬁciency for a norm in the context of a system and an objective is
not monotonic in the coalition C, consider the following existen-
tial objective:
ϕ2 = E ¬happy(b)
That is, it is possible that b is forever unhappy (we will not dis-
cuss why the designer of the normative system might have such an
objective). We have that:
K1 † (η1 ↾ {b}) |= ϕ2.
That is, if b complies with the norm η1, the objective is true. This is
because, for example, agent a can block b’s access to the printer.
However, as we saw in Example 1, K1 † (η1 ↾ {a,b,c}) |= ¬ϕ2,
so {b} is not sufﬁcient for the objective ϕ2.
We can prove that, in general, checking sufﬁciency is computa-
tionally hard.
THEOREM 2. Deciding C-sufﬁciency is co-NP-complete.
PROOF. Membership of co-NP is straightforward from the def-
initions of the problems. We prove hardness by reducing TAUT,
the problem of showing that a formula Ψ of propositional logic is
a tautology, i.e., is true under all interpretations. Let x1,...,xk
be the Boolean variables of Ψ. The reduction is as follows. For
each Boolean variable xi we create an agent ai, and in addition
create one further agent, d. We create 3k + 3 states, and create
the transition relation R and associated agent labelling α and valu-
ation V as illustrated in Figure 1(a): inside states are the propo-
sitions true in that state, while arcs between states are labelled
with the agent associated with the transition. Let S
0 = {s0} be
the singleton initial state set. We have thus deﬁned the Kripke
structure K. For the remaining components, deﬁne C = ∅, η =
{(s0,s2),(s2,s3),(s3,s5),(s5,s6),...,(s3k+2,s3k+3)}(i.e.,allthe
lower arcs in the ﬁgure), and ﬁnally, deﬁne ϕ to be the formula ob-
tained from Ψ by systematically replacing each Boolean variable xi
by (E♦xi). Now, we claim that η is C-sufﬁcient for ϕ in K iff Ψ
is a tautology. First, notice that since C = ∅, then for all C
′ ⊆ A,
we have C ⊆ C
′, and so the problem reduces to the following:
∀C
′ ⊆ A : [K † (η ↾ C
′) |= ϕ].
The correctness of the reduction is illustrated in Figure 1(b), where
we show the Kripke structure obtained when only agent 1 defects
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Figure 1: Illustrating the reduction used in Theorem 2: (a) the
Kripke structure produced in the reduction; (b) how the con-
struction corresponds to a valuation: if only agent 1 defects,
then the Kripke structure we obtain corresponds to a valuation
in which x1 is true (a state in which x1 is true is reachable in the
resulting structure – E♦x1 in the objective we construct) and
all other variables are false (i.e., are true in unreachablestates).
from the normative system; in this case, the Kripke structure we
obtain corresponds to a valuation of Ψ which makes variable x1
true and all others false.
However, the news isnot all bad: for universal objectives, check-
ing sufﬁciency is easy.
COROLLARY 1. Deciding C-sufﬁciency for objectives µ ∈ L
u
is polynomial time decidable.
PROOF. Simply check that K † (η ↾ C) |= µ; since µ ∈ L
u,
the fact that K † (η ↾ C
′) |= µ for all C ⊆ C
′ ⊆ A follows from
Theorem 1.
Next, we consider the obvious counterpart notion to sufﬁciency;
that of necessity. We say that C are necessary for η in the context
of K and ϕ iff C must comply with η in order for it to be effective,
i.e., iff:
∀C
′ ⊆ A : [K † (η ↾ C
′) |= ϕ] ⇒ (C ⊆ C
′).
The following example illustrates necessity.
EXAMPLE 3. Wecontinue Example1. Weobserved that{a,b,c}
and {a,b,d} are sufﬁcient for η1 in the context of K1 and ϕ1. In-
deed, {a,b} is necessary for η1 in the context of K1 and ϕ1. Both
a and b must comply with the norm for the objective to be satisﬁed.
THEOREM 3. Deciding C-necessity is co-NP-complete.
PROOF. Membership of co-NP is obvious from the statement of
the problem, so consider hardness. Note that proof of Theorem 2
does not go through for this case: since we set C = ∅ in the reduc-
tion, C are trivially necessary. However, we can use the same basic
construction as Theorem2 toprove NP-hardness of thecomplement
problem to C-necessity, i.e., the problem of showing that
∃C
′ ⊆ A : [K † (η ↾ C) |= ϕ] ∧ ¬(C ⊆ C
′).Wereduce SAT. Givena SAT instanceΨ, wefollow theconstruction
of Theorem 2, except that set the input coalition C to be C = {d}.
It is now easy to see, using a similarargument to Theorem 2, that Ψ
is satisﬁable iff ∃C ⊆ A : [K † (η ↾ C) |= ϕ] ∧ ¬(C ⊆ C
′).
The following sums up some general properties of the concepts
we have discussed so far. Here, “sufﬁcient” (“necessary”) means
“sufﬁcient (necessary) for η in the context of K and ϕ”.
PROPOSITION 1.
1. There might be no sufﬁcient coalitions.
2. There is always a necessary coalition: the empty coalition.
3. There might be two disjoint sufﬁcient coalitions.
4. There might be no non-empty necessary coalitions.
5. If C is necessary and C
′ sufﬁcient, then C ⊆ C
′.
6. If there are two disjoint sufﬁcient coalitions, then there is no
non-empty necessary coalition.
PROOF.
1. Trivial. Take, e.g., a system consisting of a single state with
a self-loop and where p is true, and let ϕ = E f ¬p. η must
be empty, and ϕ can never be true.
2. Immediate.
3. Take again the system fromthe ﬁrst point, and let ϕ = E f p.
Both {a} and {b} are sufﬁcient, for any a  = b.
4. Take the system and formula in the previous point.
5. Let C be necessary and C
′ sufﬁcient. From sufﬁciency of
C
′ we have that K † (η ↾ C
′) |= ϕ, and from necessity of
C it follows that C ⊆ C
′.
6. Immediate from the above point.
Note that point 5 above implies that every necessary coalition is
contained in the intersection of all sufﬁcient coalitions. Does the
other direction hold, i.e., is the intersection of all sufﬁcient coali-
tions necessary? In the general case the answer is “no” , as the
following example illustrates.
EXAMPLE 4. TakethesysteminFigure2, andletϕ = E f A f p.
It is easy to see that:
• {a} is sufﬁcient;
• K † (η ↾ {b}) |= ϕ;
• None of {b}, {c} or {b,c} are sufﬁcient.
From the ﬁrst and last point it follows that {a} is the intersection
of all sufﬁcent coalitions; from the second point it follows that {a}
is not necessary.
However, for universal objectives the greatest necessary coali-
tion is exactly the intersection of the sufﬁcient coalitions:
LEMMA 1. When the objective is a formula in L
u, the intersec-
tion of all sufﬁcient coalitions is a necessary coalition.
PROOF. Let ϕ ∈ L
u and let C =
T
C′ sufﬁcient C
′. Assume
that K † (η ↾ C2) |= ϕ; we must show that C ⊆ C2. From
Theorem 1 we have K † (η ↾ C3) |= ϕ for any C3 such that
C2 ⊆ C3. It follows that C2 is sufﬁcient. But then C ⊆ C2.
Thus, for the case of universal objectives the necessary coalitions
are exactly the subsets of the intersection of the sufﬁcient coali-
tions. Indeed, in Examples 1 we saw that the intersection of the
sufﬁcient coalitions, consisting of agents a and b, is a necessary
coalition.
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Figure 2: A normative system. The dashed lines indicate “ille-
gal” transitions. The uppermost state is the single inital state.
3.1 Feasibility of Robust Normative Systems
So far, our technical results have focussed on verifying robust-
ness properties of normative systems. However, an equally impor-
tant question is that of feasibility. As we noted earlier, feasibility
basically asks whether there exists some normative system such
that, if this law was imposed (and, implicitly, everybody complies),
then the desired effect of the normative system would be achieved.
In the context of robustness, we ask whether a normative system
is robustly feasible. In more detail, we can think about robust fea-
sibility as follows. Suppose we know that some subset C of the
overall agent population is “reliable”, in that we are conﬁdent that
C can be relied upon to comply with a normative system. Then in-
stead of asking whether there exists an arbitrary normative system
η that is effective for our desired objective ϕ, we can ask whether
there exists a normative system η such that C is sufﬁcient for η
in the context of ϕ. We call this property C-sufﬁcient feasibility
1.
Formally, this question is as follows:
∃η ∈ N(R) : (K † η |= ϕ) ∧
∀C
′ ⊆ A : (C ⊆ C
′) ⇒ [K † (η ↾ C
′) |= ϕ].
It turns out that, under standard complexity theoretic assumptions,
checking this property is harder than the (co-NP-complete) veriﬁ-
cation problem.
THEOREM 4. Deciding C-sufﬁcient feasibility is Σ
p
2-complete.
PROOF. We deal with the complement of the problem, which
we show to be Π
p
2-complete. The complement problem is that of
deciding:
∀η ∈ N(R) : (K † η |= ϕ) ⇒
∃C
′ ⊆ A : (C ⊆ C
′) ∧ (K † (η ↾ C
′)  |= ϕ).
Membership is immediate from the deﬁnition of the problem. For
hardness, we reduce the problem of determining whether QBF2,∀
formulae are true [9, p.96]. An instance of QBF2,∀ is given by a
quantiﬁed Boolean formula with the following structure:
∀ ¯ x1 ∃ ¯ x2 χ( ¯ x1, ¯ x2) (1)
inwhich ¯ x1 and ¯ x2 aredisjoint setsofBoolean variables, and χ( ¯ x1, ¯ x2)
is a propositional logic formula (the matrix) over these variables.
Such a formula is true if for all assignments to Boolean variables
¯ x1, there exists an assignment to ¯ x2, such that χ( ¯ x1, ¯ x2) is true un-
der the overall assignment. An example of a QBF2,∀ formula is:
∀x1∃x2[(x1 ∨ x2) ∧ (x1 ∨ ¬x2)] (2)
1It may at ﬁrst sight seem strange that we consider this problem:
why not simply look for a normative system η such that A(η) =
C? Our rationale is that the worst case corresponds to only C
complying with the normative system; it may well be that we get
better results if more agents comply.The reduction is related to that of Theorem 2, although slightly
more involved. Let ¯ x = {x1,...,xg} be the universally quantiﬁed
variables in the input formula, let ¯ y = {y1,...,yh} be the existen-
tially quantiﬁed variables, and let χ(¯ x, ¯ y) be the matrix. We create
a Kripke structure with 3(3(g + h) + 3) states and g + h agents.
We create variables corresponding to ¯ x and ¯ y, and in addition to
these, we create a variable end. The overall structure is deﬁned to
be as shown in Figure 3; note that end is true only in the ﬁnal state
of the structure. We set C = {1,...,g}, and create the objective
ϕ to be
ϕˆ =(¬E♦end) ∨ (¬χ
∗(¯ x, ¯ y))
where χ
∗(¯ x, ¯ y) is the CTL formula obtained from the propositional
formula χ(¯ x, ¯ y) by systematically substituting (E♦v) for each
variable v ∈ ¯ x ∪ ¯ y. Correctness follows from construction. Since
the complement problem is Π
p
2-complete, C-sufﬁcient feasibility
is Σ
p
2-complete.
4. K-ROBUSTNESS
The notions of robustness described above are based on identify-
ing some “critical” coalition, whose compliance is either necessary
and/or sufﬁcient for the correct functioning of the overall norma-
tive system. In this section, we explore a slightly different notion,
whereby we instead quantify the extent to which a normative sys-
tem is resistant to non-compliance. We introduce the notion of
k-robustness, where k ∈ N: intuitively, saying that a normative
system is k-robust will mean that it remains effective as long as k
arbitrary agents comply.
As with C-compliance, we can consider k-compliance from the
point of view of both sufﬁciency and necessity. Where k ≥ 1, we
say a normative system η is k-sufﬁcient (w.r.t. some K, ϕ) if the
compliance of any arbitrary k agents is sufﬁcient to ensure that
the normative system is effective with respect to ϕ. Formally, this
involves checking that:
∀C ⊆ A : (|C| ≥ k) ⇒ (K † (η ↾ C)) |= ϕ.
As with checking C-sufﬁciency, checking k-sufﬁciency is hard.
THEOREM 5. Deciding k-sufﬁciency is co-NP-complete.
PROOF. Membership of co-NP is obvious from the problem def-
inition; for hardness, we reduce TAUT, constructing the Kripke
structure, normative system, and objective as in the proof of Theo-
rem 2; and ﬁnally, we set k = 0. The correctness argument is then
as in Theorem 2.
We deﬁne the resilience of a normative system η (w.r.t. K, ϕ) as
the largest number of non-compliant agents the system can tolerate.
Formally, the resilience is the largest number k, k < n, such that
∀C ⊆ A : (|C| ≤ k) ⇒ (K † (η ↿ C)) |= ϕ.
where n is the number of agents. It is easy to see that the resilience
of η is the largest number k such that η is (n − k)-sufﬁcient. Ob-
serve that the resilience is undeﬁned iff the objective does not hold
even if all agents comply to the norm (K † η  |= ϕ). It is immedi-
ate that computing the resilience of a normative system is co-NP-
complete with respect to Turing reductions.
EXAMPLE 5. We continue Example 3. While both {a,b,c}
and {a,b,d} are sufﬁcient coalitions, η1 is not 3-sufﬁcient wrt.
K1,ϕ1 because not every three-agent coalition is sufﬁcient. It is 4-
sufﬁcient (the objective is satisﬁed if the grand coalition complies).
Thus, the resilience is equal to 0.
Now consider the situation where a has left the computer facil-
ity; b,c,d remains. Let K
′
1,η
′
1,ϕ
′
1 be the corresponding variants
of K1,η1 and ϕ1. Now, each of {b,c}, {b,d} and {c,d} are suf-
ﬁcient. Thus, η
′
1 is 2-sufﬁcient wrt. K
′
1,ϕ
′
1, and the resilience is
1.
Wethen deﬁne k-necessity in the obvious way – η isk-necessary
(w.r.t. K, ϕ) iff:
∀C ⊆ A : (K † (η ↾ C)) |= ϕ ⇒ (|C| ≥ k).
THEOREM 6. Deciding k-necessity is co-NP-complete.
PROOF. Membership of co-NP is again obvious from the prob-
lem deﬁnition; for hardness, we reduce SAT to the complement
problem, proceeding as in Theorem 3; where l is the number of
Boolean variables in the SAT instance, we set k = l + 1. Correct-
ness of the reduction is then straightforward.
We say that η is k-robust, k ≥ 1, if it is both k-sufﬁcient and k-
necessary. In other words, η is k-robust if it is effective exactly
in the event of non-compliance of any arbitrary coalition of up to
n − k agents: η is k-robust iff
∀C ⊆ A : (|C| ≤ n − k) ⇔ (K † (η ↿ C)) |= ϕ.
where n is the number of agents. From the results above, it is
immediate that checking k-robustness is co-NP-complete.
EXAMPLE 6. Wecontinue Example5. While{a,b}isthelargest
necessary coalition, η1 is 3-necessary wrt. K1,ϕ1 because at least
threeagents mustcomply(inthiscase, either{a,b,c}or{a,b,d}).
It is not k-robust for any k, because it is 4-sufﬁcient but not 3-
sufﬁcient, and 3-necessary but not 4-necessary.
η
′
1 is both 2-sufﬁcient and 2-necessary wrt. K
′
1,ϕ
′
1. It is thus
2-robust. Thus, the objective will be maintained if and only if at
least 2 agents comply.
EXAMPLE 7. We continue Example 6. Consider yet another
variant: the agents are again all four a,b,c,d, but their needs
have changed. Now each agent only needs a PC, i.e., Useful(a) =
Useful(b) = Useful(c) = Useful(d) = {R3}. Now wehave that
no singleton coalition is sufﬁcient and every two-agent coalition is
sufﬁcient. The system is 2-sufﬁcient, 2-necessary, 2-robust and its
resilience is 4 − 2 = 2.
The following sums up some general properties of the concepts
of k-robustness. Here, “k-sufﬁcient” (“k-necessary”) means “k-
sufﬁcient (k-necessary) in the context of K and ϕ”.
PROPOSITION 2.
1. Any system is 0-necessary.
2. If the system is k-sufﬁcient, then C is sufﬁcient for any C
such that |C| ≥ k.
3. If C is necessary, then the system is |C|-necessary.
4. If the system is k-sufﬁcient for k < n, then no non-empty
coalition is necessary.
5. k-robustness is unique: if the system is k-robust and k
′-
robust, then k = k
′.
PROOF.
1.-3. Immediate.x
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Figure 3: Illustrating the reduction used in Theorem 4.
4. Let k < n and assume that the system is k-sufﬁcient and
that C  = ∅ is necessary. Let C
′ be a coalition such that
|C
′| ≥ k. By k-sufﬁciency, K † (η ↾ C
′) |= ϕ, and by
necessity of C, C ⊆ C
′. Since C
′ was arbitrary, we have
that C ⊆
T
|C′|≥j C
′. Assume that a ∈ C. Let |C1| = k.
a ∈ C1. Now letb ∈ A\C1 (b existsbecause k < n = |A|),
and let C2 = C1 \ {a} ∪ {b}. |C2| = k, but a  ∈ C2 which
contradicts the assumption that a ∈ C. Thus, C must be
empty.
5. If the system is k-robust and k
′-robust for k > k
′ and C
′ is a
coalition of size k’, then by k
′-sufﬁciency (K † (η ↾ C)) |=
ϕ and by k-necessity it follows that |C| ≥ k which is not the
case.
5. A LOGICAL CHARACTERISATION OF
ROBUSTNESS
We have thus far seen two different ways in which we might want
to consider robustness: try to identify some “lynchpin” coalition,
or try to “quantify” the robustness of the normative system in terms
of the number of agents whose compliance is required to make the
normative system effective. Often, however, robustness properties
will not take either of these forms. For example, here is an argu-
ment about robustness that one might typically see: “the system
will not overheat as long as at least one sensor works and either
one of the relief valves is working or the automatic shutdown is
working”. Clearly, such an argument does not ﬁt any of the types
of robustness property that we have seen so far. So, how are we
to characterise such properties? The idea we adopt is to charac-
terise the robustness by means of a coalition predicate. Coalition
predicates were originally introduced in [3] as a way of quantifying
over coalitions. A coalition predicate, as the name suggests, is sim-
ply a predicate over coalitions: if P is a coalition predicate, then it
denotes a set of coalitions – those that satisfy P.
Weﬁrstintroduce thelanguage of coalition predicates(from[3]),
and thenshow how thislanguage canbeused tocharacterise robust-
ness properties. Syntactically, the language of coalition predicates
is built from three atomic predicates subseteq, supseteq, and geq,
and we derive a stock of other predicate forms from these
2. For-
mally, the syntax of coalition predicates is given by the following
grammar:
P ::= subseteq(C) | supseteq(C) | geq(n) | ¬P | P ∨ P
2In fact, we could choose asmaller base of predicates to work with,
deriving the remaining predicates from these, but the deﬁnitions
would not be succinct; see the discussion in [3].
eq(C) ˆ = subseteq(C) ∧ supseteq(C)
subset(C) ˆ = subseteq(C) ∧ ¬eq(C)
supset(C) ˆ = supseteq(C) ∧ ¬eq(C)
incl(i) ˆ = supseteq({i})
excl(i) ˆ = ¬incl(i)
any ˆ = supseteq(∅)
nei(C) ˆ =
W
i∈C incl(i)
ei(C) ˆ = ¬nei(C)
gt(n) ˆ = geq(n + 1)
lt(n) ˆ = ¬geq(n)
leq(n) ˆ = lt(n + 1)
maj(n) ˆ = geq(⌈(n + 1)/2⌉)
ceq(n) ˆ = (geq(n) ∧ leq(n))
Table 1: Derived coalition predicates.
where C ⊆ A is a set of agents and n ∈ N is a natural number.
The circumstances under which a coalition C0 ⊆ A satisﬁes
a coalition predicate P are speciﬁed by the satisfaction relation
“|=cp”, deﬁned by the following rules:
C0 |=cp subseteq(C) iff C0 ⊆ C
C0 |=cp supseteq(C) iff C0 ⊇ C
C0 |=cp geq(n) iff |C0| ≥ n
C0 |=cp ¬P iff not C0 |=cp P
C0 |=cp P1 ∨ P2 iff C0 |=cp P1 or C0 |=cp P2
We assume the conventional deﬁnitions of implication (→), bicon-
ditional (↔), and conjunction (∧) in terms of ¬ and ∨. We also
ﬁnd it convenient to make use of the derived predicates deﬁned in
Table 1.
Now, given a Kripke structure K, normative system η, objec-
tive ϕ, and coalition predicate P, we say that P characterises the
robustness of η iff the compliance of any coalition satisfying P is
sufﬁcient to ensure that η is effective (w.r.t. K, ϕ). More formally,
P characterises the robustness of η w.r.t. K and ϕ iff:
∀C ⊆ A : (C |=cp P) ⇔ ((K † (η ↾ C)) |= ϕ).
Now, consider the following simple coalition predicate.
supseteq(C) (3)
Expanding out the semantics, we have that (3) characterises the
robustness of a normative system η w.r.t. K, ϕ iff:
∀C
′ ⊆ A : (C ⊆ C
′) ⇔ ((K † (η ↾ C)) |= ϕ).
In other words, (3) expresses that C are necessary and sufﬁcient.
As another simple example, the predicate geq(k) characterises therobustness of η iff η is k-robust. The decision problem of P-
characterisation is that of checking whether a given coalition pred-
icate P characterises robustness in the way described above. Since
we can use P-characterisation to express necessary and sufﬁcient
coalitions, we have the following.
COROLLARY 2. Deciding P-characterisationisco-NP-complete.
Notice that P-characterisation is fully expressive with respect to
robustness properties, in that any robustness property can be char-
acterised with a coalition predicate of the form:
eq(C1) ∨ eq(C2) ∨     ∨ eq(Cu).
for some u ∈ N. In the worst case, of course, we may need a
coalition predicate where u may be exponential in the number of
agents.
Let us consider some example coalition predicates, and what
they say about robustness. Recall the informal example we used
in the introduction to this section. Let S be a set of sensors, let
R be the set of relief valves, and let a be the automatic shutdown
system. Then the following coalition predicate expresses the ro-
bustness property expressed in this argument.
nei(S) ∧ (nei(R) ∨ incl(a))
The coalition predicate any expresses the fact that the normative
system is trivial, in the sense that it is robust against any deviation
(in which case it is unnecessary, since the objective will hold of the
original system). The coalition predicate ¬any expresses the fact
that the normative system will fail w.r.t. its objective irrespective of
who complies with it.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated three types of robustness: necessary and/or
sufﬁcient coalitions; the number of non-compliant agents that can
be tolerated; and, more generally, a logical characterisation of ro-
bustness.
Fitoussi and Tennenholz [6] formulate two criteria when choos-
ing between different social laws. Simplicity tries to minimise, for
each agent, the differences between states in terms of the allowed
actions. The idea behind minimality is to reduce the number of
forbidden actions that are not necessary to achieve the objective.
Obviously, these two criteria typically conﬂict: one may sacriﬁce
one in favour of the other. One would expect that there is a trade-
off between minimality and robustness, and that minimality of η
would coincide with the grand coalition A being necessary for it.
This match is not perfect, however: ﬁrst of all, if the latter condi-
tion holds, there still may be more transitions forbidden for A than
necessary to guarantee the objective ϕ. Secondly, it might be that
not all agents in A are constrained by η. But what we do have is
that a minimal norm η must have A(η) (the agents involved in it)
as a necessary coalition.
Recently, French et al. proposed a temporal logic of robustness
[7]. A brief description of the main ideas, using our formalisms, is
as follows. Let η be a norm. A path π complies with η if for no
n ∈ N, (π[n],π[n + 1]) ∈ η, i.e., no step in π is forbidden. Let
Oϕ mean that ϕ is obligatory: it is true in s if for all η-compliant
s-paths, ϕ holds. Pϕ (ϕ is permitted) is ¬O¬ϕ. Given an s-path
π, let
∆
1
s(π) = {π
′ | π
′ is s-path ,∃j ∈ N∀i < jπ(i) = π
′(i) &
π
′[j + 1]π
′[j + 2]... complies with η}
In words: π
′ ∈ ∆
1
s if it is like π up to some point j, in j it
may do an illegal step, but from then on complies with the norm.
French et al. then deﬁne an operator  ϕ (‘robustly, ϕ’) which is
true on a path π, if for all paths in ∆
1
s(π), and π itself, ϕ is true.
So,  ϕ is true in a η-complient path, if it is true in all paths that
have at most one η-forbidden transition. This is a way of bringing
robustness in to the object language. However, note that in [7],
there is no notion of agency: only the system can deviate from or
comply with a norm. If ϕ is a universal formula, then K,s0 |=
P ϕ would imply (in our framework) that there is a single agent
i such that A \ {i} is sufﬁcient for Eϕ, given K and η. Although
it seems a good idea for future work to incorporate such ‘deontic-
like’ operators in the object language, even the semantics of [7] is
quite different from ours: whereas [7] focusses on the number of
illegal transitions, we are concerned with the number of compliant
agents, or compliant coalitions.
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